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Abstract 
This article explores the impact of the 25 January protests in Egypt on a specific 
group of people who continue to struggle for social and political change: the UK-
based Egyptian diaspora. Through an exploration of diaspora politics, the article sheds 
light on how UK activists challenge dominant approaches to democracy and 
democratisation. I argue that this case of diaspora politics calls for a continued inquiry 
into what democracy is and how it is imagined, particularly in transnational contexts. 
 
Keywords: Democracy; Democratisation; Diaspora politics; Egyptian revolution; 
learning.  
 
Introduction 
 
Five years on from the 18 days of uprisings that ended Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year rule, 
Egypt remains economically, socially and politically unstable. In 2012, Muslim 
Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi narrowly won the presidency. Mass 
demonstrations on 30 June 2013 saw him detained and, after a violent and bloody 
summer, Egypt’s return to military rule was underway. Under former defence minister 
President El-Sisi, elected in June 2014, opposition activists remain committed to 
various aspects of Egypt’s struggle and continue to engage in practices of contentious 
politics and social action in Egypt and abroad, despite increased risk (Dunne 2015). 
Some of the personal accounts that emerged in the aftermath of 25 January such as 
those by Ahdaf Soueif (2012) and Wael Ghonim (2012) highlight the participation of 
UK-based Egyptians in Egypt’s political sphere before and during the 18 days. But, 
while their participation during the 18 days has been evidenced in academic 
scholarship (see Fawzy 2012; Ramadan 2013) and online anecdotal contributions, 
there are few detailed and in depth analyses of diaspora mobilisation for social and 
political change. 
 
This article examines the particular case of Egyptian activists in the UK, arguing that 
diasporas are important actors within the global polity. Through continued learning 
and reflection on democracy and through participation in social action, they shape 
politics in their place of origin. This study of diaspora demonstrates the complexities 
of transnational political activism and presents a challenge to post-nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism. These positions argue that, alongside globalised markets and 
universalising norms such as human rights, the nation-state has become less relevant 
(see Habermas 1998; Soysal 2000). Responding to many of the questions raised by 
globalisation, proponents of cosmopolitanism also question the relevance of the 
nation-state as the focus of democratic theory, arguing for a rethinking of democracy 
as operating within and across borders (Held 1999). While there is traction in such 
lines of inquiry, diasporas, with real and ‘imagined’ (Anderson 1983) connections to 
more than one place, complicate understandings and processes of politics and 
democracy in the globalised world.  
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Although the material realities of globalisation, such as migration, present a 
contemporary global political context that is transnational, networked and dynamic, 
this case shows that ‘politics remains fundamentally about local issues even while 
political processes are increasingly globalized’ (Lyons and Mandaville 2010: 125). 
Diasporas are political actors with multiple and dual identities (Klandermans 2014), 
consciously identifying with more than one territory or nation-state and having 
various interests, views and positions that shape their engagement and participation in 
social and political change. These identities are also subjective and dynamic in 
degree, shade and strength (Huddy 2001). Despite the various complexities associated 
with social and political identities, diasporas’ participation in the politics of the 
homeland is, in part, motivated by ‘connectedness’ (Gilroy 1993) to the ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson 1983). This case shows that, as well as having sub-identities 
(for example, leftist, secular, nationalist, anti-coup or Islamist…) that shape their 
participation and learning, the connection to Egypt remains central to why people 
mobilised in this moment, in that context: to some extent, identification with and 
‘connectedness’ to the nation-state can explain why people participated, while the 
sub-identity explains how. 
 
Accepting the important debates around definitions of diaspora, this article’s focus on 
activism adopts a definition that stresses intentionality and conscious engagement in 
the politics of the homeland, where diasporas are “generated out of politics…as 
political effect rather than a social given” (Lyons and Mandaville 2010: 125). 
Understanding diasporas as created through their mobilisation (Sökefeld 2006) 
emphasises the dynamic and complex nature of contemporary transnational political 
activism and activists’ political identities (Simon and Klandermans 2001). Similarly, 
in line with Bayat’s (2002:3) understanding of activism as ‘the antithesis of passivity’, 
diaspora, in this article, refers specifically to Egyptians living in the UK, whether 
temporarily or permanently, who have been or continue to be mobilised and actively 
engaged in transnational politics related to social and political change in Egypt. I 
intentionally utilise the term ‘struggle’ to indicate that there are many ways in which 
people perceive, experience and seek to create change Kandil argues that the protests 
of 25 January are ‘one of many episodes of struggle’ (2012:4). Indeed my 
interlocutors agree with this view:“for many of us, it is an ongoing revolution… we 
haven’t reaped the fruit of the revolution yet” (Amira, 40s, Egyptian, UK 10+ years, 
secular).  
 
This article will show that activists’ understandings of democracy – frequently 
reflecting an affective dimension so often ignored in democratic theory - sit uneasily 
between (and sometimes contrary to) the dominant Western liberal, representative 
democracy and alternatives informed by notions of direct democracy. It is within and 
through this space of unease that the argument is advanced: as activists’ learning 
about and engagement with democracy continues to evolve, so should inquires into 
what democracy might mean - for whom, in what form, in what ways, with what goal. 
In her critique of post-politics’ ‘end of ideology’ thesis, Mouffe (2005) argues against 
consensus-based politics that have removed conflict from ‘the political’, subsequently 
repressing alternatives and other democratic possibilities. Her agonistic framework 
challenges the dominance of Western liberal democracy and warns of the dangers of 
reifying forms of democracy that diffuse and deflect rather than expose and 
reconstitute power relations. ‘Egypt seems to be moving towards greater 
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consolidation of the security agenda and populist politics’ (Salamey 2015: 121), a 
context where neither consensus nor compromise is imminent. The paper, therefore, 
suggests there is a need for more theoretical and empirical exploration of the 
continuing process of struggle that utilises and seeks alternative understandings of 
democracy. Such inquiries provide a counter to dominant analyses of the Egyptian 
struggle that are framed within Western liberal theories of democratisation and 
democratic transition. In order to contribute to this conversation, this analysis takes 
into account dominant and alternative approaches to democracy. It recognises the 
necessity for continued reflection on what democracy (and therefore democratisation) 
means in the contemporary political context in which diasporas are political actors 
whose positions are informed by experiences of and reflections on both liberal 
‘democracies’ and authoritarianism.  
 
Methods and Context 
 
The paper draws from a UK-based study of diaspora activists, which took place over 
the period of nine months in 2014. This project investigated how Egyptian activists 
engaged with processes of social change in Egypt, particularly focusing on what and 
how they learned through their participation in movements and at protests and 
demonstrations. Through qualitative methods, I explored activists’ understandings of 
and attitudes towards various aspects of politics and social change, examining how 
and why they changed or developed in particular ways.  
 
Quotations are taken from some of the 28 extended interviews conducted in the UK in 
English (some Arabic terms were explored) with Egyptian activists who I met at 
demonstrations and via snowball sampling through contacts within the activist and 
Egyptian networks, including people I knew prior to the research through my previous 
work in the region. The study also draws on participant observation at demonstrations 
and protests and in online spaces such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, where I 
observed the interactions and conversations between activists.  
 
Egyptians in the UK reflect the same divisions and tensions in Egypt, and the three 
dominant perspectives aligned to the nationalist / security, Islamist and secular 
agendas (see Dunne 2015; Grand 2014). Yet, the labels used to align an activist with a 
particular group may not be so clear-cut. Beneath the apparently defined groups are 
significant areas of tension that warn against homogenising or simplifying accounts of 
a highly complex context. Therefore, I acknowledge that many of the terms associated 
with the struggle - for example, 25 January, 30 June, anti-coup, Islamist, 
revolutionary socialist, leftist, secular or nationalist - are problematic but also 
recognise that, at this stage, they afford some scope for delineation within a brief 
analysis. When these labels are used, they reflect general leanings and should not be 
regarded as definitive. For example, some activists shifted in their perspective within 
the course of the research because of particular moments such as Morsi’s detention or 
El-Sisi’s election, while others sympathised with more than one position 
simultaneously. 
 
As well as providing the activists’ general position (secular, anti-coup, nationalist…) 
in the text, I note the approximate number of years that a person had been living in the 
UK or their status in relation to Egypt/UK (e.g. UK 4+, dual citizenship). In response 
to requests for anonymity and taking into account the relatively small number of 
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activists mobilising within the UK, this information, along with their age, is kept 
vague and all names are pseudonyms.  
 
The research took place between February and November 2014, in the run up to El-
Sisi’s election and its aftermath. This period followed the 30 June protests, Morsi’s 
detention on 3 July, the massacre at Rab`a, and civil unrest during the summer of 
2013. The majority of interviews were undertaken with activists aligned to 
leftist/secularists and anti-coup/Islamists. The anti-coup activists, though small in 
number, held regular demonstrations and protests, while leftist / secular opposition 
activists were engaging more individually. Interviews suggest 2014 was an important 
period of reflection for the latter. During the presidential elections in May 2014, I 
particularly interviewed and observed supporters of El-Sisi, generally referred to as 
nationalists.  
 
Finally, it must be noted that this paper refers specifically to Egyptian activists and 
draws on their reflections on their experiences. Findings cannot be generalised to 
Egyptians across the UK as a whole; in-fact, participant observation and interviews 
suggest significant numbers of Egyptians living in the UK did not participate in any 
form of active engagement during or since 25 January.    
 
Diaspora politics and the Egyptian revolution  
 
Studies of diaspora and migration are arguably dominated by analyses of the 
economic relationship between migration and development rather than the important 
dimension of their political and social contribution. This is not to diminish the role of 
diaspora in economic development - remittances are significant to Egypt’s economy, 
with over $17 million sent to Egypt in 2013, for example, amounting to 6.6% of the 
GDP (World Bank 2014) – but diasporas offer more than just economic support to 
their place of origin. Diasporas have been important actors in contemporary wars 
(Kaldor-Robinson 2002) and contribute in many ways to domestic and transnational 
struggles for social and political change (see Lyons and Mandaville 2012), thus 
influencing politics in both ‘home’ and ‘sending’ countries (see Sheffer 2003).  
 
What interests my article is a direction yet unexplored: how does mobilising for 
political change in the home country shape the engagement of diasporas living in a 
‘host’ country, including understanding of and participation in politics in both 
contexts? Literature on Arabs in Britain suggests that while they become 
economically integrated, they reportedly do not ‘integrate on the political and cultural 
levels’ (Fawzy 2012:48) and display a low level of political engagement and 
participation in UK politics (Atlantic Forum 2009). Indeed, Aly observes how local 
councillors respond to this narrative and thus call for more Arabs to ‘get involved in 
British politics’ (2015:11). Two related findings emerge in my study. First, prior to 25 
January, some secular and anti-coup activists were previously engaged in Egyptian 
politics, though interviewees who identified with secular and revolutionary views 
were more likely to report being active in their political engagement before the 18 
days. Few, however, were particularly engaged in British politics. Second, three 
politicising phases emerged that significantly shaped activists’ political engagement 
and understanding vis-à-vis both Egypt and the UK: (1) 25 January (referencing the 
18 days of protests that culminated in the resignation of autocrat Hosni Mubarak), (2) 
30June/3July (denoting the mass protests against the Muslim Brotherhood President, 
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Mohammed Morsi, which were followed by his detention by the army and a summer 
of violence, including the massacre of hundreds of Morsi supporters at various sit-ins 
such as Rab`a) and (3) the election of former defence chief, El-Sisi, in 2014 (regarded 
by his opponents as signifying the return to military rule). After the 25 January 
events, activists from all groups report becoming generally more politicised and 
interested in Egyptian politics. Interest in US/UK foreign policy, on the other hand, 
increased among Egyptian diasporas after 30June/3July. Some anti-coup activists 
(predominantly, females in the 18-25 age group) revealed a new engagement in 
British politics as a consequence of what they regard as the UK government’s 
(non)response to the 2013 ‘coup’ and Rab`a massacre, and the subsequent British 
support for El-Sisi’s presidency. 
 
Sheffer (2003) explores how and why diasporas participate in politics at ‘home and 
abroad’, thus creating and influencing politics within various spaces. As political 
actors emerge out of an increasingly global and transnational context, diasporas 
illustrate how ‘networks of influence that transcend both the territorial and the formal 
are crucial features of contemporary politics, although they are often overlooked’ 
(Lyons and Mandaville 2010: 135). Because diasporas are connected to more than one 
space, they can be viewed as transnational agents of different social movements 
related to those spaces (Clifford 1994; Della Porta 2005). The flow of ideas across 
transnational space can also encourage members of the diaspora to offer financial and 
political support to fund struggles in the ‘homeland’ (Adamson 2005). Diasporas, 
therefore, represent a globalised context where actors with varying histories and 
identities participate in diverse processes of social change, locally and globally.    
 
This paper builds on literature that defines diasporas as those who mobilise for 
political change in their homeland (see Sökefeld 2006; Lyons and Mandaville 2010). 
In this sense, diaspora, conceptually and empirically, ‘does not so much describe the 
world as seek to remake it’ (Brubaker 2005:12 emphasis in original). While diaspora 
does invoke notions of national consciousness (Kaldor-Robinson 2002), home, 
collective identity, shared solidarity and physical migration from one place to another 
(Sheffer 1986), people within diasporas take on many identities (Hall 1990) and, 
particularly within the global context, form and reform (Cohen 2009). Much of the 
terminology around diaspora politics is debated, so when I use ‘home’ and ‘place of 
origin’ to refer to the Egyptian ancestral connection, I do so acknowledging that 
diasporas often have complex family histories (for example, one activist in this study 
was born in Saudi Arabia, raised between the UK and UAE and holds an Egyptian 
passport) and that they are not homogenous with fixed characteristics (Cohen 2009). 
Arabs in London, as Aly (2015:11) illustrates, cannot be understood through terms 
such as first or second generation because ‘Arabness…is a moving target’. In sum, I 
understand diaspora as people (including short/long-term migrants) who are conscious 
and active in their connection to and solidarity with the ‘imagined community’ 
(Anderson 1983) and, importantly, who are transnational political agents (Adamson 
2012). Furthermore, this paper stresses active and sustained political engagement and 
mobilisation (Sökefeld 2006; Lyons and Mandaville 2010) to focus attention on 
diasporas’ participation in processes of transnational politics. The remainder of this 
section provides a brief overview of how Egyptian diaspora engaged in the struggle 
from and within the UK before I go on to explore their perspectives on democracy.  
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Egyptians1 generally rely on annual holidays, phone calls and remittances to retain 
their connection to Egypt from the UK (Fawzy 2012). This changed for many during 
the 25 January revolution. Despite being in the UK, diasporas participated in Egypt’s 
struggle and, particularly when communications became difficult, found a role that 
fitted with being part of a transnational network where they ‘could be the voice 
coming out of Egypt’ (Faoud, 20s, Egyptian, UK 4+ years, secular). Many decided to 
participate in the uprisings, even virtually: as well as those that returned ‘home’, 
Egyptians in the UK clicked ‘attending’ on the ‘We are all Khaled Said’ Facebook 
page, used Twitter and Facebook to distribute photos, videos and logistical support, 
and gathered outside the embassy in London to show their solidarity with 
demonstrators in Egypt. There were also demonstrations around the UK, for example 
outside the former BBC building in Manchester and in public spaces in Birmingham 
and Edinburgh. The experience of active participation during 25 January prompted 
some to not only attend but also take leading roles in the continued action in the UK. 
In the months that followed, diasporas gave speeches at demonstrations and organised 
various events. For example, they held talks and workshops to explore various aspects 
of the continuing struggle such as the 2012 constitutional referendum and presidential 
candidates, possibly inspired by the 2011 resolution that granted expatriate Egyptians 
the right to vote in elections (ElBaradei et al 2012).  
 
For the majority of activists, the 18 days remain the catalyst for a newfound 
engagement with Egypt’s social and political development that was often described 
through terms such as ‘transformational’ and ‘life-changing’. Predominantly, 25 
January signalled their first experience of contentious politics: ‘We got together and 
decided to have a demonstration or some kind of sit-in out of solidarity with the 
Egyptian revolution. And for the first time in my life, I organised political action’ 
(Ayesha, 40s, Egyptian, UK10+ years, leftist/anti-coup). As well as generating the 
moments and processes through which activists learn about democracy and social 
change, the continued participation of Egyptians, who had not been actively engaged 
in Egyptian politics prior to the 18 days, suggests that the revolution was a ‘critical 
event’ that created an imagined transnational community (Sökefeld 2006). Mobilised 
diasporas continued to return to Egypt to attend sit-ins during the summer and winter 
of 2011 when the world’s media had largely disappeared from Tahrir Square and 
protesters were being attacked during their demands for presidential elections. Some 
diaspora activists travelled to Egypt in the period after 25 January when Egypt was 
controlled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), under the leadership 
of Field Marshall Tantawi. Dina explains that she and her friend travelled to Egypt to 
attend demonstrations during the post-Mubarak period, when they felt most needed. 
Having fewer people in the squares made demonstrating dangerous and the presence 
of more people was therefore necessary:  
They can only attack you if you’re a small group because if you are a witness 
no-one can protect you, but if you are a bigger group they won’t attack you 
and they have to play smart, so I called a friend (in the UK) who went back 
with me, once with [against] SCAF, the previous army head, and once 
                                                        
1 ONS census data (2011) puts the figure of Egyptians living in the UK at less than 30,000 whereas 
Karmi (1997) and Fawzy (2012) cite estimates of 100,000-250,000. Egyptians reflect “all forms of 
religious, professional and social diversity” (Fawzy 2012:48) and have not settled in a particular place 
or region (Karmi 1997). Therefore, terms such as ‘community’ must be approached with caution when 
talking about Egyptians in the UK.  
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[against] Morsi (Dina, 30s, Egyptian, UK 6+ years, secular).  
 
Despite the significance of the 18 days to the formation of an active Egyptian 
diaspora in the UK, other periods such as the sit-ins in 2011, the 2012 elections and 
30June/3July also prompted diaspora mobilisation, though the numbers of Egyptians 
attending and holding demonstrations in the UK reduced considerably after 
Mubarak’s resignation. The drop in numbers appears to substantiate claims made in 
this study that attitudes and activism of Egyptians in the UK mirror those in Egypt: 25 
January was a moment when Egyptians came together in a ‘utopian’ display of 
national solidarity, but divisions between three key positions (Islamist, secular, 
nationalist) shaped the kind of mobilisation that followed. Across all groups and 
periods of change, the overwhelming justification for participation was solidarity: to 
show Egyptians within Egypt they were not alone in their demands for social and 
political change and to highlight this solidarity to government officials in the UK and 
to the British media (Underhill, 2016). Fouad explains, 
We started writing letters to MPs, telling them this is what is happening in 
Egypt and you have to put pressure on the [British] government not to support 
the Egyptian regime. Trying to think of any way of doing something that we 
can be sort of the voice of the people in Egypt (20s, Egyptian, UK 4+ years, 
secular). 
  
One of the points to draw out from this section is the continued centrality of the 
nation-state to diasporic groups, despite the analytical critique of this concept. 
Participating in the struggle has broadly strengthened diaspora activists’ identification 
with Egypt. The formation of specific groups in the UK (such as those lobbying for or 
against the ‘coup’) and the presence of British-Egyptians in Egypt during the protests 
(at Rab`a protests, for example), if anything, confirm that diasporas are formed 
through multiple identities that intersect and intensify with changing contexts. That 
they mobilise specifically in relation to Egypt demonstrates the continued relevance 
of the nation-state and the notion of the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983).  
 
Having offered a brief glimpse of UK-based activism in the Egyptian case, the 
remainder of the paper explores the connection between diaspora mobilisation and 
understandings of democracy. 
 
Rethinking and learning in revolution: diaspora perspectives on democracy 
 
This study finds that activists learn through a continuing process of observation, 
reflection, new or reinterpreted understandings, new inquiries and, crucial for critical 
learning, action (see Freire 1970, Allman 1999, 2001). As studies of social movement 
learning demonstrate (see Foley 1999; Hall and Turay 2006; Hall et al 2012), 
important learning happens informally and incidentally when engaging in activism. 
Focusing on what diaspora activists learned about democracy through their 
engagement and participation enable a closer examination of the connection between 
activism and democratisation by foregrounding the perspectives of the people who are 
at the centre of the calls for change. At the heart of activists’ mobilisation was a 
complex discourse of democracy that warrants investigation; activists in this study 
reflected on democracy, questioned its meaning and reinterpreted it in light of the 
events in Egypt (and the global response). Connecting this to the diaspora perspective 
highlights the importance of rethinking democracy for the contemporary global 
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political context. Through their participation and engagement - in the UK, Egypt and 
online - in the four years following 25 January, diaspora activists gained new 
knowledge, skills, insights and perspectives about themselves, the world around them 
and their role in creating change (Underhill 2016; in press). Although this paper is 
predominantly informed by critiques of liberal democracy and consensus-based 
politics, the established discourses on democracy (and subsequently, democratisation 
and democratic transition) are foundational precisely because of the ways in which 
they emerge within the activists’ reflections. Attention to these discourses complicates 
our understanding of the location of diasporas within global politics and the need to 
incorporate diaspora politics in the theorisation of democracy.  
 
Within mainstream scholarly literature and among the broader public, understandings 
of democracy have been dominated by liberal notions of an ‘end-point’ (Grugel and 
Bishop 2014), where democracy is reduced to a set of implementable processes and 
institutions. Concepts such as nation, state and citizen determine a person’s legitimacy 
as a political actor within a given context. Theories of democratisation and democratic 
transition, in the liberal sense, represent democracy through the language of freedoms, 
equality, legal justice, institutions, electoral processes and control of the military, and 
do so in ways that can be empirically observed and measured (see Diamond 2008). 
Transition-based paradigms are predominantly guided by liberal, rational and 
materialistic approaches where democratisation is represented by ‘not only free and 
fair elections but also the creation of democratic institutions and an accompanying 
democratic political culture’ (Grand 2014: 22). Predominantly based on empirical 
analyses from Europe and the US (Munck 2001), ‘transitologists’ emphasise elites, 
leadership and state actors, while other non-state actors (such as social movements 
and activists) are marginalised (Della Porta 2014).  
 
These liberal, administrative and technical dimensions of democracy featured heavily 
in activists’ reflections on the Egyptian struggle, despite often going on to explore the 
importance of ‘people based politics.’ They debated referendums, constitutional 
reforms and elections, political parties and leaders, and issues of governance, policies 
and programmes. For many, these were new experiences that prompted significant 
shifts in understanding the institutional and procedural aspects of democracy. For 
example, Salma noted,  
My first time ever to read the constitution was the Egyptian one. I don't think I 
have ever sat down and read one. I don't see myself understanding all these 
things but in the first Egyptian constitution I actually read everything and 
followed the whole six-month process, watching videos, and I was critical and 
reading all of the different things put in the constitution. Because they had this 
thing for expats to write down what they think and I was sending in my 
opinion’ (Salma, 20s, dual-nationality, anti-coup activist). 
 
Such engagement with the procedural dimensions of democracy is not unusual. In the 
lead up to referendums and presidential elections, Egyptian diasporas discussed and 
disseminated the constitution online, held lectures and events in London for other 
Egyptians (for example, to discuss the presidential candidates), and travelled to Egypt 
during periods of voting to discuss which way to vote with friends and family. 
Activists reflected a belief that - in 2012, at least - these formal processes held the 
potential for democratisation, suggesting an underlying outcome/end-point 
understanding of democracy. However, it is important to note Salma’s reference to 
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the consultation process of the 2012 constitutional referendum where the participatory 
dimension of democracy was brought to the fore: she suggests that the inclusion of 
‘expats’ encouraged her participation. By being part of the process, she sought new 
knowledge, reflected on the content and implications of the constitution, and 
discussed it with family and friends. Although people like Salma uphold formalistic 
approaches to democracy, sometimes unquestionably, they alert us to the importance 
of locating democracy in new spaces. Democracy, from this perspective, could be 
viewed as existing in processes of political learning that navigate and balance the 
mechanisms of liberal democracy with the direct participation of society.  
 
Activists learned through broader ‘bottom-up’ understandings of democracy that 
emphasise the role of people in social change. In this sense, approaches such as 
participatory or deliberative democracy present a challenge to the hegemony of ‘top-
down’ approaches by taking aim at the unequal power relations that liberal democracy 
deploys and preserves. The Egyptian protests were a case in point. The popular slogan 
of the revolution, ‘Bread, Freedom and Social Justice’, reflected on state-society 
relations and the composition of Egyptian society as a whole. As well as alluding to 
the ‘Bread Riots’ of 1977 that followed the withdrawal of state subsidies for staple 
foods, the slogan captured anger and frustration of Egyptians at rising living costs, 
increasing inequality and police brutality (Achcar 2013). ‘The people’ encapsulated 
their grievances with the state, highlighting the struggle of those who were oppressed, 
marginalised and excluded, economically, politically and socially.  
 
During 25 January, activists engaged in debates about the ideas behind the slogan, 
though generally fell short of discussing how to bring about such change, as various 
interviewees agreed. These discussions of change were nevertheless pivotal for 
activists who had not previously participated in political or social action and felt they 
were gaining new insights into notions of revolutionary change and struggle, 
particularly when they engaged with experienced opposition (leftist/secular) activists. 
For many, these discussions enabled them to learn how power permeates society and 
to contemplate their role in creating change. Despite the return of the military with El-
Sisi, the experience of participating in the revolutionary moment empowered many 
opposition activists who ‘started to believe more in people-based politics because of 
the revolution’ (Ayesha, 40s, Egyptian, UK10+ years, identifies with leftists and anti-
coup positions). Therefore, an important dimension for considering the prospects of 
democratisation in Egypt is to consider what this ‘people-based politics’ means and 
how it manifests in processes of social change. This is only possible through coming 
to terms with people’s understandings and perspectives of the kind of change they 
seek and the ways they contribute. 
 
One of the most important perspectives that contribute to this article’s quest to 
animate ‘democracy’ is the manner in which democracy is believed to transcend 
formal politics. Despite often referring to electoral processes and institutions, activists 
also understand democracy as the ways in which people within a society relate to each 
other, often through language that highlights the affective dimension of politics. 25 
January was often described (by activists who went to Egypt as well as those 
demonstrating and participating within the UK) as ‘utopia’ and a time and space 
where people from all backgrounds ‘were living democracy’ (Amira, 40s, Egyptian, 
UK 10+ years, secular). Diasporas reflected on the civility they perceived to be 
emerging during this time, particularly for British-Egyptians and long-term migrants, 
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one which contrasted with previous experiences of life in Egypt. Ahmad noted, for 
example, ‘I only heard three words from the 28th [of January] to the 11th [of 
February, during the 25 January protests]: sorry, excuse me, thank you. Sorry, excuse 
me, thank you. [It was] the first time in my life to hear this in Egypt’ (Ahmad, 40s, 
UK 10+ years, dual citizenship, anti-coup). Similarly, Mona travelled to Tahrir from 
the UK with her father and brother to attend the demonstrations and recalls the 
following,  
Arriving at the airport it was all the same Egypt but when you got to Tahrir 
everyone trusted each other and it was a safe Egypt. You could just go into the 
square and have conversations and talk with anyone and everyone about 
everything and it was a whole different Egypt. You know, Egypt had gotten 
worse with people not trusting each other and society had changed in the last 
few years but in Tahrir it was completely different (Mona, 20s, dual 
citizenship, anti-coup).   
 
These ‘utopian’ reflections ‘privilege’ civil society (Grugel and Bishop 2014:41) and 
reveal understandings of democracy as part of an everyday lived-experience where 
difference is accepted and society is trusting, open and safe. They sit in contrast with 
rational and instrumentalist understandings of the ‘ballot-box democracy’ (in the 
words of various interviewees), which many of the activists themselves critiqued. 
These views suggest an important but often-overlooked dimension of democracy that 
concerns how we live together. Broader conceptualisations of democracy, therefore, 
provide a lens through which to understand state-society relations. For example, 
witnessing violent crack-downs by the police and military against protestors (in 
person or through online video footage and photographs) provided material evidence 
of the ways in which ‘the state exerts power over civil society’ (Mann 1984:190 
emphasis in original), which activists had been aware but not fully cognisant of before 
the revolution (Underhill, In press). The brutality of the murder of Khaled Said by the 
police (Ghonim 2012), for example, mobilised many activists. But the violence 
directed towards protesters by state-apparatuses during ‘the 18 days’ deepened 
activists’ understanding of the relationship between the Egyptian state and its citizens 
and even fuelled their continued participation.   
On February 2 we had the infamous Battle of the Camel and I was 30 yards 
away from it, seeing people who were there being trampled and seeing police, 
disguised police officers, waving their batons around. That changed 
everything for me and it was something I was physically seeing right in front 
of me and I didn't… I wasn't going to buy that this was just some random 
Egyptians who wanted the protests to stop, no. This was the police and this 
was done by the state. They may not have been police officers but they would 
certainly [have been] sent by the state for hire or whatever. So that changed 
me and that's when I thought no, we need to carry on (Nour, 20s, dual 
citizenship, secular).   
  
Nour shows people become politicised by witnessing, observing and reflecting. As the 
struggle continued, conversations became debates. Families and friends would 
discuss, argue and analyse the reasons for and implications of various events and the 
role of various actors in different moments of change. 25 January signified the 
beginning of a continuing process of experiential learning about the relationship 
between the state and its citizens.  
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Activists’ perspectives on democracy changed by reflecting on the relationship 
between the state and its citizens. This highlights the centrality of power within 
democratic theory and shows that critical engagement with democracy requires an 
interrogation of structures of power and oppression. In the aftermath of 30June/3July, 
activists who were engaged in opposition before 25 January inquired into the 
relationship between Egypt’s regime, elite, judiciary and media. They reflected on the 
ways in which state-endorsed media controlled rhetoric, created fear of the ‘other’ 
(Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi, terrorist, foreigner, activist…) and circulated, 
reinforced and legitimised the judiciary’s actions that, for example, enabled detention 
and imprisonment (often without charge), death sentences and impunity for police 
officers who had been witnessed committing violent assaults. Such inquiries were 
transformative even for activists who were highly engaged in opposing military rule 
before the struggle: ‘I mean even [in] these pre-revolutionary years you might think 
that you knew a lot but after the revolution you discovered that there is a huge 
amount of things that you had no idea existed - how the country was run, the 
dynamics within the ruling elites and stuff…’ (Fouad, 20s, Egyptian, UK 4+ years, 
secular). 
 
Reflecting on these relationships generated learning about the institutional 
mechanisms through which the ancien regime and elites retain their power, restricting 
avenues for democracy in both top-down and bottom-up senses, controlling 
institutions and society from the top and excluding civil society participation from 
below. Furthermore, observing SCAF’s abuse of power brought home the militarised 
national identity constructed around Egypt’s colonial and revolutionary past. 
However, ‘It was very difficult for a lot of people to acknowledge that it is the army 
who are one of the factors of why we are where we are. Still, most people are in 
denial. Even among the activists they could not say “Down, Down with military rule” 
easily’ (Ayesha, 40s, Egyptian, UK10+ years, socialists and anti-coup). For many 
Egyptians, their perspectives on democracy are constrained by powerful historicised 
forces that foreclose ‘unlearning’ (Foley 1999) about the locus of power and 
oppression, in this case, the value of the military.  
 
The bloody dispersals of sit-ins and demonstrations throughout 2011-2013, sectarian 
violence, draconian anti-protest laws and the response of global powers such as the 
US and the UK have led some to conclude that a ‘ballot-box democracy’ is not 
compatible with Egypt. The proponents of this position corroborated it by citing 
history, culture, location and level of education as barriers. With connotations of 
Middle Eastern exceptionalism (Salamey 2015), some elements of nationalist and 
secular diaspora appeared to reject the possibility for democracy in Egypt and settled 
into a pro-security narrative that Egypt needs a ‘just’ or ‘benevolent dictator’. But this 
‘anti-democracy’ view was particularly derided by activists within the anti-coup 
movement: ‘They have come up with this term called ‘Dictatorship democracy’ 
[laughs] and I feel like, “Are you for real?!” Sometimes in Egypt they never fail to 
amuse…’ (Salma, 20s, dual citizenship, anti-coup activist). 
 
However ‘utopian’ the 18 days were, the events that followed presented a challenge 
for activists on all sides as they continue to struggle with what democracy is and 
could mean in the Egyptian context. Citing the removal of ‘an elected president’ 
(Morsi) and the subsequent response from Western powers (notably US and UK 
governments), activists on both sides perceived democracy to be ‘a sugar-coated lie’ 
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(Ali, 20s, dual citizenship, secular) and a ‘facade’ (Rana, 18, dual citizenship, anti-
coup). Although anti-coup campaign materials used in the UK included slogans such 
as ‘Pro-Democracy’ and ‘Democracy is Our Right’, this was arguably a repertoire 
used by this movement to draw attention to the ‘undemocratic’ nature of Morsi’s 
removal and to suggest to the British public that support for the coup (and, 
subsequently, El-Sisi) contradicts the West’s own narrative of liberal democracy 
(Underhill, 2016).  
 
The narratives uncovered within this project show that activists’ understandings of 
democracy are dynamic and subjective. While democracy as an idiom remains 
powerful, many activists reflected on the liberalised version perpetuated by ‘the West’ 
to put forward understandings of democracy that emphasise power. They struggle 
with what they perceive to be contradictions between how democracy is 
conceptualised and its material reality.   
 
Conclusions: democracy, learning and ‘the political’  
 
As students of democracy argue, ‘democratization rarely follows a linear path… there 
are likely to be stunning advances and heartbreaking reversals’ (Grand 2014: 176). 
The tumultuous events in Egypt can certainly be viewed in those terms: from 
Mubarak’s unexpected resignation in February 2011 to the massacres at Rab`a (and 
others) in August 2013, Egyptian diasporas mobilised during an emotional and 
exhausting period of change. But despite their continued endeavours, the perspectives 
of those who are supposed to be part of the democratisation process are often missing 
from many analyses. This paper sought to present some of the ways the UK-based 
diasporas participated in Egypt’s revolution and their perspectives during this 
important period of change. 
 
This case of Egyptian mobilisation shows that diasporas cannot be ignored in 
discussions of contemporary politics and democracy. Acknowledging diasporas as 
part of a nation’s social and political landscape raises questions for conceptions of 
democracy that are bounded by notions of the nation state; diasporas live within, 
between and beyond more than one nation and their perspectives are informed by 
globalised experiences and identities. As one activist who grew up in the UK 
revealed, ‘living in a so-called [British] democracy we have a different perspective 
and we should be able to talk with people in Egypt and tell them what they are 
missing’ (Mona, 20s, dual citizenship, anti-coup). Although their perspective might be 
regarded as resulting from a different diasporic experience, some migrant activists 
suggested they learned about democracy by ‘being far away, from the outside looking 
in, I can see things more clearly…more sane[ly]…’ (Heba, 50s, UK 5+ years, 
secular). Physical distance, it appears, can compel some diasporas to return home 
during a period of change. It also provides space for reflection and learning. Although 
turnout at elections has been low since the vote was granted to expatriates (ElBaradei 
et al 2012), by participating in the struggle through their varied practices and 
locations of activism, Egypt’s UK-based diasporas have situated themselves within 
Egypt’s polity, bringing with them understandings and perspectives that are informed 
by a globalised view of the world.  
 
The voices in this paper show that understandings of democracy are dynamic and 
continue to be shaped by different moments, new insights and experiences: activists 
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learn through the many processes of struggle, seeking new knowledges, developing 
new skills and coming to terms with their own actions and the actions of others. The 
18 days, for those who travelled to Egypt, like many locals, represent an alternative 
understanding of democracy as Egyptians connected with others from different 
backgrounds. This enabled an imagining of possibilities for an alternative future: in 
this moment, democracy became acceptance and tolerance in difference. However, to 
some extent, democracy can also be divisive as responses to the events of 2013 
illustrate; Egyptians became divided and polarised as Zakaria – who, since 
30June/3July, has struggled to identify with any group - commented: ‘On 30th of 
June, people did discuss that we should accept that this [Morsi] is what democracy 
brought - that we have to learn how to respect the system. In this point we get 
polarised…’ (Zakaria, 30s, UK 2+ years). The emotions associated with the struggle 
created an impasse by closing down the opportunity for debate and contestation and 
by preventing a coherent narrative of opposition to military rule. Adel, a British-
Egyptian who travelled to participate in the sit-in at Rab`a, like others in the anti-coup 
movement, admitted that since the massacre, ‘before I talk to someone, I check that 
they think like me’ (Adel, 30s, dual citizenship, anti-coup).  
 
Mouffe’s (2005) conception of passions within the political is useful for interrogating 
this impasse: democracy can be deepened through the affective dimension of politics 
because of the collective identities that can be formed. However, in the Egyptian case, 
collective identities have been constructed around fear of the other that enables the 
populist narrative of ‘security and stability’ to prevail over and divert attention away 
from an alternative narration of an emancipatory struggle of power, social justice and 
social change. Essentially, a populist, securitised and affective narrative of ‘the 
people’ as a collective identity (Mouffe 2005) has silenced and marginalised the 
struggle for ‘Bread, Freedom and Social Justice’. The consequence is that, ‘people 
tend to think [democracy] is the obvious thing - that it is about having multiple 
candidates and going to the ballot box. That's not it for sure. For me, democracy 
[means] we need to have more than a country with 40% illiteracy and 50% extreme 
poverty…’ (Dina, 30s, UK 5+ years, secular). Although it remains illusive within the 
rationalist discourse of liberal democracy, ‘the affective dimension of politics 
is…crucial for democratic theory’ as it realigns the struggle with ‘hope for the future’ 
(Mouffe 2005: 25) and highlights the emancipatory conception of politics as conflict 
and struggle (see Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014; Mouffe 2005). The activists’ voices 
in this study offer some scope to exploring the affective dimension of politics; the 
voices of Egypt’s revolution show that - despite intense frustration and division - hope 
for change endures, while the division between them reminds us that alternative 
approaches to politics and democracy are important and necessary for shared hope to 
become a reality.  
 
The Egyptian revolution has politicised a diaspora who are questioning notions of 
democracy and politics and are shaping politics within and across national borders. 
Participating during and since the 18 days has opened up opportunities for discussion 
and thinking that many activists had not experienced before. Similarly, observing the 
events unfold in the months and years that followed, and paying attention to the 
response nationally and globally, has prompted new questions, understandings and 
perspectives of the many actors and processes involved in politics and processes of 
‘democratisation’.  
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Diasporas are transnational global actors and agents (Adamson 2012) whose 
participation in the politics of ‘home’ manifests in many ways from many locations. 
Their participation exposes the limits of democratic theory that is centred on the 
nation-state, both where nation and state are bound together and where this emphasis 
is rejected, as with cosmopolitanism. Bringing together the notions of democracy, 
diaspora and learning exposes limitations of the dominant approaches within 
democratic theory and global politics precisely when they emphasise change: to 
interrogate their connections, and to keep learning, rethinking and reinterpreting our 
own conceptualisations of democracy and social change seems to be our own 
necessary and urgent struggle.  
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